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I. INTRODUCTION
Feed-in tariffs, or FITs, are minimum guaranteed resale prices
for renewably produced energy usually set by public or quasipublic authorities. 1 Exemplary of a new generation of subsidies
that are designed to stimulate the green economy, their use within
an increasingly more profitable sector highlights the growing
antagonism that exists between the current rules of the multilateral
trading system and environmental issues. 2 The World Trade
Copyright 2012, by DANIEL PEAT.
∗ PhD Candidate, Gonville and Caius College, University of Cambridge.
I would like to thank the International Institute for Sustainable Development
(IISD) for their support throughout my research, especially that of Aaron
Cosbey. I would also like to thank Thibault Fresquet, of Holman Fenwick
Willan LLP, Geneva, for his comments on a previous draft of this article.
1. For the purposes of this paper, renewable energy means energy
produced by solar, wind, geothermal and tidal processes.
2. See, The Pew Charitable Trusts, Global Clean Power: A $2.3 Trillion
Opportunity 73, THE PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS (2010), available at http://www.
pewtrusts.org/uploadedFiles/wwwpewtrustsorg/Reports/Global_warming/G20Report-LowRes.pdf.
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Organization (“WTO”) 3 has admittedly not been completely
indifferent to environmental issues in the past. 4 Progress in the
current Doha Round of negotiations, however, has stalled and
shows little sign of improving. 5 In particular, the lack of a
negotiating mandate for a substantive agreement on renewable
energy subsidies within the WTO creates tensions between
subsidies permissible under existing WTO law and those aimed at
promoting the generation of renewable energy, leaving such
subsidies vulnerable to legal challenge. This has manifested itself
in the submission of three international trade disputes involving
renewable energy subsidies to the Dispute Settlement Mechanism
(DSM) of the WTO in the past two years. 6 The two most recent
disputes, Canada—Certain Measures Affecting the Renewable
Energy Generation Sector (hereinafter “Canada—Renewables”)
3. The World Trade Organization is the organization within which
multilateral international trade agreements are negotiated, concluded and
enforced. It was created in 1994 and was preceded by the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT).
4. Notable actions by the World Trade Organization (WTO) include the
creation of a Committee on Trade and the Environment, the inclusion of select
environmental issues in the negotiating mandate of the current Doha Round, and
the explicit recognition that the WTO holds to tools to promote climate change
mitigation. Decision on Trade and Environment, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154,
available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/56-dtenv.pdf (creating
the Committee on Trade and the Environment); World Trade Organization,
Ministerial Declaration, Nov. 14, 2001, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 41 I.L.M. 746,
¶¶31-32 (2002), available at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/
min01_e/mindecl_e.pdf (negotiating the Doha Round); Director-General Pascal
Lamy, Speech at the Informal Trade Ministers Dialogue on Climate Change in
Bali, Indonesia (Dec. 9, 2007), transcript available at http://www.wto.org/
english/news_e/sppl_e/sppl83_e.htm (acknowledging the environmental goods
and services the Doha Declaration could provide). See also, Deputy DirectorGeneral Harsha V. Singh, Speech at the International Center for Trade and
Sustainable Development Trade and Climate Change Symposium in Durban,
South Africa (Dec. 5, 2011), transcript available at http://www.wto.org/
english/news_e/news11_e/envir_05dec11_e.htm#speech.
5. See, Goodbye Doha, Hello Bali, THE ECONOMIST (Sept. 8, 2012),
available at http://www.economist.com/node/21562196.
6. Request for Consultations by the United States, China—Measures
Concerning Wind power equipment, WT/DS419/1, Jan. 6, 2011, available at
http://www.worldtradelaw.net/cr/ds419-1(cr).pdf [hereinafter “China—Wind
Turbines”]; Request for the Establishment of a Panel by Japan, Canada—Certain
Measures Affecting the Renewable Energy Generation Sector, WT/DS412/5, Jun.
7, 2011, available at http://www.worldtradelaw.net/ pr/ds412-5(pr).pdf
[hereinafter “Canada—Renewables”]; Constitution of the Panel Established at the
Request of the European Union, Canada—Measures Relating to the Feed-In Tariff
Program, WT/DS426/6, Jan. 24, 2012, available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/
doclib/docs/2012/april/tradoc_149293.pdf [hereinafter “Canada—Feed-in Tariff”].
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and Canada—Measures Relating to the Feed-In Tariff Program
(hereinafter “Canada—Feed-in Tariff”), both concern the legality
of the FIT program adopted by the Canadian province of Ontario,
and should be adjudicated by a panel in the near future. 7
In the absence of a WTO agreement specifically regulating
renewable energy subsidies, this Comment has as its aim the
elucidation of lessons that can be drawn regarding permissible
subsidies for the promotion of renewable energy production within
the WTO. After describing the anatomy of a FIT and the
arguments for renewable energy subsidies in Part II, this Comment
will outline the framework and history of subsidy regulation within
the WTO Agreements in Part III. 8 Parts IV, V, and VI will analyze
the WTO Agreements and relevant Dispute Settlement
Understanding jurisprudence to proffer four lessons for
policymakers that should be borne in mind throughout the design
and implementation stages of renewable energy support measures.
These lessons aim to ensure legality at three levels of analysis:
first, the possibility of general, non-specific government support
that would not fall within the WTO definition of subsidies will be
explored; second, the paramount lesson of non-discrimination for
government support measures that do fall within the WTO
definition will be highlighted; finally, two lessons that are aimed at
ensuring that support measures fall within an “environmental
exception” potentially available under Article XX of the 1994
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) will be
discussed.
Set against the impasse in the Doha Round negotiations—now
in their twelfth year—this Comment adopts a realistic approach,
which recognizes the unlikelihood of a multilateral agreement
clarifying the status of renewable energy subsidies within the
WTO in the near future. The objective desirability of subsidies
should force policymakers to take heed of the WTO rules in the
design and implementation of support measures for renewable
energy.

7. Canada—Renewables, supra note 6; Canada—Feed-in Tariff, supra
note 6.
8. The Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of
Multilateral Trade Negotiations and the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the
World Trade Organization and Annexes, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 14
(1994); Marrakesh Agreement, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154 (1994).
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II. THE ANATOMY OF A FIT AND THE ARGUMENT FOR RENEWABLE
ENERGY SUBSIDIES
As previously noted, feed-in tariffs, or FITs, are policies
adopted by public or quasi-public bodies that guarantee the
producer of renewable energy a fixed resale price for an agreed
period of time should certain conditions be met. 9 In order to
stimulate energy production by renewable methods, the guaranteed
price is inevitably above market price for a significant period of
time to provide both security and meet the opportunity cost of the
investment to the energy producer. An illustrative example is the
Ontarian FIT at the center of the Canada—Renewables and
Canada—Feed-In Tariff disputes. Run by the Ontario Power
Authority, a body that was created by provincial government
statute in 2004,10 the program allows both large-scale (above ten
kilowatts) and small scale (less than ten kilowatts) 11 private energy
producers with qualifying renewable energy fuel sources
(including solar photovoltaic cells, water, wind and bioenergy
production systems) 12 to resell generated energy back onto the
Ontario electricity grid at a fixed price for a twenty-year period. 13
Based on this contract, the guaranteed price paid can be up to nine
and one-half times that of the cost price of electricity to general
consumers, with the possibility of annual price increases for
eligible projects. 14 Similar FIT schemes have been pursued around
9. Conditions include the use of certified renewable energy generating
equipment. See Marie Wilke, Feed-in Tariffs for Renewable Energy and WTO
Subsidy Rules: An Initial Legal Review, ICTSD PROGRAMME ON TRADE AND
ENVIRONMENT, TRADE AND SUSTAINABLE ENERGY SERIES 1 (International
Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development, Geneva, Switz., Aug. 2011),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1919517.
10. Ontario Electricity Act 1998 (as amended), S.O. 1998, Chapter 15,
Schedule A, Part II.1, art. 25.1(1), available at http://www.e-laws.gov.on.ca/
html/statutes/ english/elaws_statutes_98e15_e.htm.
11. Small-scale FIT projects fall within the remit of the Ontario Power
Authority (OPA) microFIT program. See Ontario Power Authority, microFIT
Program Overview v. 2.0, ONTARIO POWER COMPANY, available at http://
microfit.powerauthority.on.ca/sites/default/files/microFIT%20Program%20Over
view%20v%20%201%206%20FINAL%20.pdf (last visited Sept. 29, 2012)
[hereinafter “OPA microFIT Program Overview”].
12. Ontario Power Authority, Feed-In Tariff Program: Program Overview
4, ONTARIO POWER AUTHORITY (2010), available at http://fit.powerauthority.
on.ca/Storage/11160_FIT_Program_Overview_August_new_price_version_1.3.
1_final_for_posting-oct_27.pdf [hereinafter “OPA FIT Program Overview”].
13. Id. at 30.
14. Calculated on the basis of a rooftop solar photovoltaic cell producing
less than 250 kilowatts and the lower-tier price plan of the Ontario Energy
Board. Ontario Power Authority, FIT Price Schedule, ONTARIO POWER
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the world. For example, eighteen out of the twenty-seven European
Union member-states have adopted schemes guaranteeing
minimum resale prices for renewably produced electricity, 15 as
well as similar schemes existing within Australia, 16 China,17
India, 18 South Africa, 19 and Switzerland. 20 Within the United
States, FIT schemes have been adopted on a state, regional or
municipal level in thirty-seven states 21 including California, 22

AUTHORITY (Sept. 30, 2009), http://fit.powerauthority.on.ca/fit-price-schedule;
Ontario Energy Board, Electricity Prices, ONTARIO ENERGY BOARD,
http://www.ontarioenergyboard.
ca/OEB/Consumers/Electricity/Electricity+Prices (last visited Oct. 2, 2012).
15. Misha Bechberger & Danyel Reiche, The spread of renewable energy
feed-in tariffs (REFITs) in the EU-25, WIND-WORKS.ORG, http://www.windworks.org/FeedLaws/bechberger_reiche_fTheSpread%20of%20Feed%20Laws
%20in%20the%20EU.pdf (last visited Oct. 2, 2012).
16. See generally, Department of the Environment, Climate Change, Energy
and Water, Electricity Feed-In Tariff Scheme, AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY
GOVERNMENT, http://www.environment.act.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0005/
144608/FiTFactSheet.pdf (last visited Oct. 2, 2012).
17. See generally, Baizhen Chua, China Sets Solar Power Price to Boost
Profits, Investment, BLOOMBERG NEWS (Aug. 1, 2011, 2:49 PM), http://www.
bloomberg.com/news/2011-08-01/chinese-government-sets-nationwide-solarphotovoltaic-power-on-grid-prices.html.
18. See generally, Jawaharlal Nehru National Solar Mission Toward
Building SOLAR INDIA, INDIA.GOV.IN, http://india.gov.in/allimpfrms/alldocs/
15657.pdf (last visited Sept. 11, 2012); Frequently Asked Questions on Biomass
Power Generation, GOVERNMENT OF INDIAN MINISTRY OF NEW AND
RENEWABLE ENERGY, http://mnre.gov.in/file-manager/UserFiles/faq_biomass.
htm (last visited Sept. 11, 2012).
19. National Energy Regulator of South Africa, In the matter regarding
Renewable Energy Feed-in Tariffs—Phase II by the National Energy Regulator
of South Africa, NATIONAL ENERGY REGULATOR OF SOUTH AFRICA,
http://www.nersa.org.za/Admin/DocumentUpload/UploadFiles/REFIT%20Phas
e%20II%20Reasons%20for%20Decision3531242010113153.pdf (last visited
Sept. 11, 2012).
20. Compensatory feed-in remuneration: Important information on the
registration process, SWISS FEDERAL OFFICE OF ENERGY, http://www.bfe.admin
.ch/energie/00588/00589/00644/index.html?lang=en&msg-id=18371 (last visited
Oct. 2, 2012).
21. The full list of states in which FIT schemes are in force is Alabama,
Alaska, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, District of Columbia,
Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Nevada, New
Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania,
Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Vermont, Virginia,
Washington, and Wisconsin. Database of State Incentives for Renewables &
Efficiency—Financial Incentives, US DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, http://www.
dsireusa.org/incentives/index.cfm?EE=1&RE=1&SPV=0&ST=0&searchtype=P
roduction&sh=1 (last visited Sept. 12, 2012).
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Colorado, 23 and Florida. 24 FITs have already successfully
contributed to increasing the amount of renewable energy
produced. For example, the United Kingdom FIT scheme,
introduced by the Labour Government in April 2010, contributed
to a forty-one-fold increase in the domestic use of solar panels and
a forty-five percent reduction in their cost price. 25 Similarly
successful has been the German FIT, which—in its twenty-oneyear existence—has contributed to the augmentation of renewable
energy production in the energy sector from five to twenty
percent. 26
The rationale for government support measures for renewable
energy, such as FITs, is based on two strands of argument:
economic and environmental. Within the former, renewable energy
is recognized as being produced at quantities below the social
optimum for two reasons. 27 First, greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions
do not impose a direct cost upon the producer or consumer, unless
operating within the jurisdiction of a carbon emissions trading
scheme, such as the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme. 28
The inability to internalize the cost of GHG emissions upon society
causes underpricing, and consequential overconsumption, of
energy produced by non-renewable sources. Additionally, the
inability of markets to account for the societal cost of GHG
emissions in prices means that consumers and producers do not
have a financial incentive to pursue innovation in methods of
renewable energy production that aim to reduce the cost of GHG

22.
23.
24.
25.

Assem. B. 1969, 2005–2006 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2006).
COLO. REV. STAT. § 40-2-127 (2010).
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 377.806 (West 2011).
UK Government changes to Feed-in Tariffs—new and proposed,
ENERGY SAVING TRUST, http://www.energysavingtrust.org.uk/Generatingenergy/
Getting-money-back/Feed-In-Tariffs-scheme-FITs/UK-Governmentchanges-to-Feed-in-Tariffs-new-and-proposed (last updated July 2012); Fuel
Costs per kWh, BIOMASS ENERGY CENTER, http://www.biomassenergycentre.
org.uk/portal/page?_pageid=75,59188&_dad=portal (last visited Sept. 11, 2012).
26. Christoph H. Stefes, The German Solution: Feed-In Tariffs, THE N.Y.
TIMES (updated Sept. 21, 2011, 5:42PM), http://www.nytimes.com/
roomfordebate/2011/09/20/why-isnt-the-us-a-leader-in-green-technology/usshould-emulate-germanys-renewable-energy-model.
27. The social optimum is the point on the utility possibility frontier that
maximizes social welfare; John Black, Nigar Hashimzade, and Gareth Miles,
Oxford Dictionary of Economics (2009), available at http://www.oxford
reference.com/views/ENTRY.html?subview=Main&entry=t19.e3900.
28. Climate Action: Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS), EUROPEAN
COMMISSION, http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/index_en.htm (last updated
Nov. 15, 2010).
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emissions to society. 29 This market failure, which is termed the
“environmental externality,” therefore results in the sub-optimal
production of renewable energy. Second, analysts have pointed out
that the market for energy is far from the perfect theoretical
economic model, having been indelibly shaped by governmental
policies supporting non-renewable methods of energy production
for decades. 30 While the removal of these subsidies offers the
potential for a reduction in GHG emissions, 31 their continued
existence keeps non-renewably produced energy at market prices
significantly lower than that produced by renewable methods.
Therefore, for renewable energy to be competitive in the market, it
must be supported to overcome pre-existing market failures. 32
Aside from the aforementioned market failures specific to
renewable energy, support for government intervention in the
renewable energy market is also premised on general industrial
policy that aims to realize latent comparative advantage within
markets should certain market failures be overcome. 33 Within this
strand of reasoning, entrepreneurs do not invest capital in the
production of renewable energy because they cannot fully
internalize the benefits of their investment. For example, “spillover” externalities may include the appropriation and exploitation
of methods or knowledge by competitors, 34 or increased
productivity enjoyed by competitors or firms operating in other

29. Hussein Abaza, Vesile Kulaçoğlu, Anne Olhoff, Benjamin Simmons,
Ludivine Tamiotti & Robert Teh, The United Nations Environment Program and
the World Trade Organization, Trade and Climate Change 110–11, WORLD
TRADE ORGANIZATION (2009), available at www.wto.org/english/res_e/
booksp_e/trade_climate_change_e.pdf.
30. Robert Howse, Climate Change Mitigation Subsidies and the WTO
Legal Framework: A Policy Analysis 5–6 (2010), available at http://www.iisd.
org/pdf/2009/bali_2_copenhagen_subsidies_legal.pdf.
31. International Energy Agency, World Energy Outlook Insights, Looking
at Energy Subsidies: Getting the Prices Right 10 (1999), http://www.
worldenergyoutlook.org/media/weowebsite/2008-1994/weo1999.pdf.
32. Abaza et al., supra note 29, at 111.
33. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Special Report on
Renewable Energy Sources and Climate Change Mitigation 870 (O. Edenhofer, R.
Pichs-Madruga, Y. Sokona, K. Seyboth, P. Matschoss, S. Kadner, T. Zwickel, P.
Eickemeir, G. Hansen, S. Schlömer & C. von Stechow eds., 2012), available at
http://srren.ipcc-wg3.de/report/IPCC_SRREN_Full_Report.pdf/view [hereinafter
IPCC, Renewable Energy Sources].
34. Mark Huberty & Georg Zachmann, Green Exports and the Global
Product Space: Prospects for EU Industrial Policy 3–5 (Bruegel, Working Paper
No. 2011/07, 2011), available at http://www.bruegel.org/publications/publicationdetail/publication/556-green-exports-and-the-global-product-space-prospects-foreu-industrial-policy/.
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markets, 35 both at the expense of the investor. Further, it is argued
that the market for renewable energy suffers from capital market
imperfections that cause a lack of available funding for
entrepreneurs, due to either an over-estimation of the risk of
investment caused by imperfect information regarding the product,
or from the inability to demonstrate the effectiveness of a product
or method on a small scale. 36 This curtailment of capital flow
causes a sub-optimal investment in renewable energy, which is
used as a further justification for intervention in the market.
In addition to economic arguments based on failures within the
market for renewable energy, the place of renewable energy
production as a means of climate change mitigation also provides a
strong argument in favor of government support. Anthropogenic
climate change—caused by GHG emissions resulting from human
activity—has been deemed to be 90% likely the cause of the
“unequivocal” 37 climate change that threatens to irreversibly
damage the world’s ecosystem. 38
Aside from pure environmental damage, climate change
jeopardizes global security in myriad ways; it threatens to slash the
economic prosperity of states, 39 cause a rise in the global sea
level, 40 and endanger the health of millions of people worldwide. 41
Such is the speed of the global warming that even according to the
most optimistic estimates, the world temperature will inevitably
35. This externality comprises both Jacobian (benefitting firms within the
same market) and Marshallian (benefitting firms in different stages of the value
chain) elements. Id. at 3.
36. Abaza et al., supra note 29, at 111. This information failure can be
overcome through the construction of government-funded demonstration
models. See also Office of Carbon Capture and Storage, United Kingdom
Department of Energy & Climate Change, UK Carbon Capture and Storage
(CCS) Commercial Scale Demonstration Program (Dec. 2010), http://www.
decc.gov.uk/assets/decc/what%20we%20do/uk%20energy%20supply/energy%2
0mix/carbon%20capture%20and%20storage/1075-uk-ccs-commercialscaledemonstration-programme-fu.pdf.
37. Lenny Bernstein et al., Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change,
Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report 30 (2007), available at http://www.
ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/syr/ar4_syr.pdf. See also Elizabeth Muller,
250 Years of Global Warming: Berkeley Earth Releases New Analysis,
BERKELEY EARTH SURFACE TEMPERATURE (July 29, 2012), http://berkeleyearth.
org/pdf/berkeley-earth-press-release-july-29.pdf.
38. United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development, Rio de
Janiero, Braz., June 20–22, 2012, The Future We Want–Outcome Document ¶25,
¶190, U.N. Doc. A/66/L.56, Annex I (July 24, 2012).
39. Nicholas Stern, The Stern Review: The Economics of Climate Change—
Summary of Conclusions (2006), http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/media/3/2/
Summary_of_Conclusions.pdf.
40. Bernstein et al., supra note 37, at 46.
41. Id. at 48.
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rise by between 1.8 and 2 degrees Celsius by the end of the twentyfirst century. 42 Mitigation and adaptation are the two approaches
advocated for dealing with this unprecedented change—the former
focuses on the reduction of GHG emissions, which could be
effectuated through inter alia the promotion of renewable
energy, 43 while the latter aims to reduce vulnerability of society to
the predicted changes that global warming may cause, such as
storms, droughts and floods. 44 The power generation sector stands
currently as the largest contributor to GHG emissions at just under
25% of the total emissions in 2000, providing one of the greatest
potentials for mitigation efforts. 45 On the international level,
coordination mechanisms that support the financing of mitigation
efforts exist,46 but are focused on assisting developing and leastdeveloped countries in mitigation. As a result, they are not to be
viewed as more than complementary efforts to policies enacted on
the national level. 47
Both the economic and environmental arguments for market
intervention and the lack of globally inclusive mechanisms to
promote mitigation on the international plane place the burden of
renewable energy promotion on national governments. Policies or
laws adopted to pursue these ends by WTO members therefore
potentially fall under the regulation of the WTO Agreements. 48
III. THE REGULATION OF SUBSIDIES WITHIN THE WTO
The regulation of subsidies has been a contentious issue since
the inclusion of the first attempts to discipline the use of subsidies
in the WTO’s predecessor, the General Agreement of Tariffs and
Trade (GATT). It provided that subsidies increasing exports, or
limiting imports, could be subject to a request for consultations by
a member-state with a view to “the possibility of limiting the
subsidization.”49 By the Tokyo Round of negotiations, from 1973
to 1979, subsidies had grown to become “a more contentious
42. Bernstein et al., supra note 37, at 45; Abaza et al., supra note 29, at 4.
43. Bernstein et al., supra note 37, at 73.
44. Abaza et al., supra note 29, at 56.
45. Id. at 26.
46. Notably the Global Environment Facility, established by the World
Bank in 1991. Global Environment Facility, About GEF (Dec. 1, 2011),
http://www.thegef.org/gef/whatisgef.
47. Cf. IPCC, Renewable Energy Sources, supra note 33, at 871.
48. It is worth noting that the promotion of renewable energy by national
governments is now also inevitably based on considerations of profit for the
national economy. The Pew Charitable Trusts, supra note 2, at 9, 26.
49. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, art. XVI §A(1), Oct. 30, 1947,
61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT].
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issue.” 50 The Tokyo Round of negotiations was characterized by
the pursuit of particular interests by certain GATT member-states 51
within a broader negotiating remit than had previously been
undertaken. 52 This served as a marked departure from the
adherence to classical liberal economic principles that originally
underpinned the conclusion of the GATT in 1947, and the
pursuance of mercantilist self-interest by members resulted in a set
of compromised agreements inevitably couched in vague
language. 53 The abuse of subsidies and countervailing measures
aimed at offsetting the effect of a subsidy within an importing
country was viewed by some members as a growing and distorting
non-tariff influence on international trade and often protected
inefficient production at the expense of competitive industries.54
Led by the US and EEC, the increasing concern over subsidies
resulted in the 1979 Tokyo Round Subsidies Code, 55 whose
provisions, while prohibiting certain subsidies, 56 were so “vague as
to invite differences of interpretation, some others [were] so weak
as to provide few constraints over subsidy practices that adversely
affected the interests of other countries.” 57 The optional character
of the Code exacerbated weaknesses caused by deficiencies in the
text of the Code, such as the lack of a clear definition of a subsidy.
50. Peggy A. Clarke & Gary N. Horlick, The Agreement on Subsidies and
Countervailing Measures, in 1 THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: LEGAL,
ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS 682 (Patrick F.J. Macrory, Arthur E.
Appleton & Michael G. Plummer eds., 2005).
51. Particularly the US, Japan, the European Economic Community (EEC),
and the group of Less Economically Developed Countries. Stephen D. Krasner,
The Tokyo Round: Particularistic Interests and Prospects for Stability in the
Global Trading System, 23 (4) INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY 491, 509
(1979).
52. The Tokyo Round was notably the first round of negotiations in which
the GATT membership discussed lowering non-tariff barriers––obstacles to
trade which stem from any action that is not an import tariff upon goods. Nontariff negotiations in the Tokyo Round included agreements upon subsidies and
countervailing measures, customs valuation, government procurement, technical
barriers and standards, and import licensing procedures. Id. at 508.
53. Id. at 517.
54. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Multilateral Negotiations,
Statement by GATT Director-General on Tokyo Round, reprinted in 18 I.L.M.
553, 569 (1979).
55. Agreement on Interpretation and Application of Articles VI, XVI and
XXIII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, GATT B.I.S.D. (26th
Supp.) at 56 (1979) [hereinafter “Tokyo Round Subsidies Code”].
56. Notably export subsidies. Id. at art. 9.
57. Negotiating Group on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Meeting
of 16-17 March 1987, MTN.GNG/NG10/1 ¶5 (Mar. 27, 1987), available at
http://www.wto.org/gatt_docs/English/SULPDF/92020058.pdf.
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The successor of the Tokyo Round of negotiations, the
Uruguay Round, started in February 1987. The Uruguay Round
spanned more negotiating material than the Tokyo Round and,
crucially, reiterated the importance of lowering non-tariff barriers
to trade such as subsidies. Subsidies and countervailing measures
were given a separate “negotiating track” to other non-tariff
barriers, which manifested the importance placed on the
conclusion of a new agreement on the subject and implicitly
acknowledged the failures of the Tokyo Round Subsidies Code.58
While issues did arise in the negotiating process, GATT members
quickly agreed upon, and negotiated within, the framework of a
“traffic light” system of subsidies, which classified subsidies as
either non-actionable (green), actionable (amber) or prohibited
(red). Substantive negotiation from 1989 onwards therefore
focused on coming to agreement upon the definitions of each of
these three kinds of subsidies. 59 These negotiations resulted in the
proposal of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing
Measures in 1991, 60 which was adopted with minor changes as
part of the conclusion of the Round in 1994.
Currently, therefore, the regulation of subsidies under the
existing WTO Agreements falls predominantly within the remit of
the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures
(hereinafter “SCM Agreement”). 61 Should a WTO member believe
that subsidies implemented or directed by another WTO memberstate are in breach of the provisions of the SCM Agreement, they
may request consultations with the other member in pursuance of a
mutually-acceptable solution to the dispute. 62 If a mutually agreed
solution is not reached within thirty days (for prohibited subsidies)
58. JOHN CROOME, RESHAPING THE
OF THE URUGUAY ROUND 41 (1994).

WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: A HISTORY

59. Id. at 200.
60. GATT Secretariat, Draft Final Act Embodying the Results of the
Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, MTN.TNC/W/FA (Dec. 20,
1991).
61. Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A,
1869 U.N.T.S. 14 [hereinafter “SCM Agreement”]. Agricultural subsidies are
regulated within the framework of the Agreement on Agriculture. Agreement on
Agriculture, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, Annex 1A, 1867 U.N.T.S. 410. While outside the remit of this
article, it should be noted that FITs have been challenged under Article III.4 of
the GATT and Article 2.1 of the Agreement on Trade-Related Investment
Measures. Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, Annex 1A, 1868 U.N.T.S. 186 [hereinafter “TRIMs Agreement”].
See also Canada—Renewables, supra note 6, at 3; Canada—Feed-in Tariff,
supra note 6, at 3.
62. SCM Agreement, supra note 61, at arts. 4.1, 7.1.
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or sixty days (for actionable subsidies), the complaining member
may request that the WTO Dispute Settlement Body (DSB),
comprised of the complete WTO membership, to convene a panel
to adjudicate the dispute. 63 If the complaining member is
successful in contending before a panel that another member’s
policy is a prohibited subsidy under Article 3 of the SCM
Agreement before a WTO dispute settlement panel, the panel can
recommend removal of the offending subsidy by the implementing
member. 64 Should the panel’s determination not be abided by, the
complaining member may win authorization to put in place
“appropriate countermeasures,” 65 which has in the past been
understood to mean trade restrictions of a quantum equivalent to
the full amount of the illegal subsidy. 66 If a WTO panel deems a
subsidy to be an illegal actionable subsidy under Article 5 of the
SCM Agreement, the implementing or directing member must take
measures to remove the “adverse effects” of the subsidy, or
withdraw the subsidy completely. 67 If the member does not take
effective measures following a ruling of illegality, the complaining
member may gain authorization to put in place “countermeasures,
commensurate with the degree and nature of the adverse effects
determined to exist.”68 Panel reports in both instances may be
appealed to the highest WTO tribunal, the Appellate Body, which
makes a definitive determination on the dispute. 69
Based upon an analysis of the WTO Agreements and
jurisprudence, the following three sections introduce lessons that
should be borne in mind in the policy design stage of renewable
energy subsidies, and which intend to function on three different
levels. The first is aimed at creating support measures that do not
fall within the SCM definition of a subsidy. The second is aimed at
ensuring that a support measure that does fall within the definition
of a subsidy evades being deemed an illegal subsidy. The third and
fourth lessons pertain to ensuring that the subsidy, even if it is
designated a prohibited subsidy or illegal actionable subsidy, may
63. Id. at arts. 4.4, 7.4.
64. Id. at art. 4.7.
65. Id. at art. 4.10.
66. See Appellate Body Report, United States—Tax Treatment for “Foreign
Sales Corporations” WT/DS108/AB/R ¶90 (Feb. 24, 2000), download available
at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds108_e.htm [hereinafter
“US—FSC”]; Decision by the Arbitrators, Brazil—Export Financing Programme
for Aircraft—Recourse to Arbitration by Brazil under Article 22.6 of the DSU and
Article 4.11of the SCM Agreement, WT/DS46/ARB (Aug. 28, 2000), available at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/46arb_e.pdf.
67. SCM Agreement, supra note 61, at art. 7.8.
68. Id. at art. 7.9.
69. Id. at arts. 4.9, 7.7.
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avail itself of the exception potentially available under Article XX
of the GATT.
IV. LESSON ONE—THE PROSPECT OF NON-SPECIFICITY
In order to be classified as a subsidy within the meaning of
Articles 1 and 2 of the SCM Agreement, the support measure must
meet three cumulative criteria. 70 First, the purported subsidy must
be a measure or policy adopted by a governmental or public body
which provides a financial contribution to its recipients. 71
Financial support is understood in a wide sense, with Article 1.1(a)
exhaustively listing “financial contribution” as the direct transfers
of funds, 72 provision of loan guarantees, 73 the foregoing of revenue
otherwise due (for example, tax breaks), 74 provision of goods or
services other than general infrastructure, or the purchase of
goods. 75 Article 1.1(a)(1)(iv) also encompasses the case in which a
government “entrusts or directs” a private body to effectuate a
financial contribution as understood in the preceding provisions of
the Article (hence encompassing the scenario where a private
energy provider is directed to run a FIT program by
government). 76 Second, the measure must confer a benefit on the
recipient under Article 1.1(b) of the SCM Agreement, which has
been understood by the Appellate Body to mean “mak[ing] the
recipient ‘better off’ than it would otherwise have been, absent that
70. Articles 1 and 2 of the SCM Agreement are “general provisions” of the
Agreement, which define a subsidy and the circumstances in which a subsidy is
to be considered specific, respectively. SCM Agreement, supra note 61, at arts.
1, 2.
71. Id. at art. 1.1(a).
72. Id. at art. 1.1(a)(1)(i).
73. Id.
74. Id. at art. 1.1(a)(1)(ii). This provision is manifestly aimed at the
inclusion of tax breaks into the concept of subsidies, and is to be understood—
presuming a generalized corporate tax regime—as foregoing revenue that would
be collected but for the measure in place. US—FSC, supra note 66. See also
Appellate Body Report, Canada—Certain Measures Affecting the Automotive
Industry, WT/DS139/AB/R, WT/DS142/AB/R ¶¶ 90–94 (May 31, 2000).
75. SCM Agreement, supra note 61, at art. 1.1(a)(1)(iii).
76. Entrusting or directing a private body under Article 1.1(a)(1)(iv) was
understood by the panel in United States—Measures Treating Export Restraints
as Subsidies as being composed of three elements: (1) an explicit affirmative
action, be it delegation or command; (2) addressed to a particular party; (3) the
object of which is a particular duty or task. Report of the Panel, United States—
Measures Treating Export Restraints as Subsidies, WT/DS194/R ¶8.29 (Jun. 29,
2001), available at http://www.worldtradelaw.net/reports/wtopanelsfull/usexportrestraints(panel)(full).pdf. See also Clarke & Horlick, supra note 50, at
691.
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contribution.” 77 This does not necessarily mean that the benefit
conferred will be equal to the financial contribution in each case,
and it is to be determined with reference to the conditions that the
recipient would otherwise have been exposed to in the
marketplace. 78 Third, the purported subsidy must be specific,
under the meaning of Article 2 of the SCM Agreement. The
requirement of specificity was designed as “an initial screening
mechanism to winnow out only those foreign subsidies which truly
are broadly available and widely used throughout an economy.” 79
Specificity is understood as either the limitation of a subsidy to a
certain type of enterprise, whether explicitly based on the
characteristics of the enterprise 80 or their geographical location,81
or limitation to a certain group of enterprises as the de facto effect
of the subsidy. 82 Finally, subsidies falling within the definitions of
prohibited subsidies under Article 3 of the SCM Agreement are
automatically considered to be specific. 83
The first lesson relies upon the above-mentioned specificity
criteria that must be present for support to fall within the definition
of a subsidy for the purposes of the SCM Agreement. Originally
intended to ensure that government spending upon public goods
that are used incidentally by domestic producers such as roads and
police did not come within the remit of the SCM Agreement, the
specificity criteria could equally be used to exempt subsidies for
renewable energy from regulation under the Agreement. 84 Like
transportation infrastructure and police forces, the nature of
renewable energy as a public good suggests that governments
should adopt broad climate change mitigation support strategies in
order to maximize the positive externality of mitigation efforts.
While these benefits would be global—and hence not fully benefit
the domestic economy—the economic consequences of the
harshest effects of global warming and the potential effects on a
highly interconnected global economy certainly indicate that states
have a vested interest in pursuing broad mitigation policies. Once
it is decided to pursue a broad policy, a government could
77. Appellate Body Report, Canada—Measures Affecting the Export of
Civilian Aircraft, WT/DS70/AB/R ¶157 (Aug. 2, 1999), available at http://
www.worldtradelaw.net/reports/wtoab/canada-aircraft(ab).pdf.
78. Id.
79. See Clarke & Horlick, supra note 50, at 694.
80. SCM Agreement, supra note 61, at art. 2.1(a).
81. Id. at art. 2.2.
82. Id. at art. 2.1(b).
83. Id. at art. 2.3.
84. ANDREW GUZMAN & JOOST H.B. PAUWELYN, INTERNATIONAL TRADE
LAW 414 (2009).
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effectively avoid specificity if they instituted a horizontal,
generally accessible subsidy based on neutral economic criteria,
such as one that is available throughout all sectors of the economy
and contingent upon adoption of a technology or process that
affords a certain level of GHG reduction from pre-existing
emission levels. The adoption of such a policy takes advantage of
Article 2.1(b) and footnote 2 of the SCM Agreement, which
provide respectively that:
Article 2.1(b): Where the granting authority, or the
legislation pursuant to which the granting authority
operates, establishes objective criteria or conditions
governing the eligibility for, and the amount of, a subsidy,
specificity shall not exist, provided that the eligibility is
automatic and that such criteria and conditions are strictly
adhered to. . . . 85
SCM Agreement, note 2: Objective criteria or conditions, as
used herein, mean criteria or conditions which are neutral,
which do not favour [sic] certain enterprises over others, and
which are economic in nature and horizontal in application,
such as number of employees or size of enterprise. 86
While a generally available subsidy based on objective criteria
could evade the remit of the SCM Agreement, it would not be
without difficulties. First, the political and financial viability of
extending such a subsidy to all sectors of the economy—as would
be necessary to avoid specificity—is questionable. A cut in fossil
fuel subsidies could go some way to funding the policy, yet the
financial burden of and the political will for the adoption of a
general subsidy would differ greatly between countries, and
feasibility would have to be assessed on a country-by-country
basis. Second, the administrative burden of maintaining such a
subsidy would inevitably be large, and may extend the adoption of
such a subsidy beyond the reach of some countries. The world’s
largest GHG-emitting countries, however, are those within the G20
group of developed countries, which have a demonstrated
willingness and capability to resource large renewable energy
promotion programs. 87 The additional burden that a general

85. SCM Agreement, supra note 61, at art. 2.1(b) (emphasis added).
86. Id. at art. 2.1(b), n. 2 (emphasis added).
87. For example, twelve member-states of the G20 (including the US, China,
South Korea, and the EU 27) responded to the global economic crisis of 2008–
2009 by committing to stimulus packages focused on the green energy sector that
amounted to $194 billion. The Pew Charitable Trusts, supra note 2, at 26.
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subsidy may cause does not, therefore, seem out of reach of those
countries in which its application may be most effective.
V. LESSON TWO—THE ABSOLUTENESS OF NON-DISCRIMINATION
Since the expiration of a category of virtuous “non-actionable”
subsidies that were exempt from the provisions of the SCM
Agreement in 2000, 88 subsidies now fall within two categories—
either prohibited or actionable subsidies. Prohibited subsidies are
those that are, in law or fact, contingent upon export
performance—tied to anticipated or actual export earnings 89—or
those subsidies whose provision is contingent on the use of
domestic over imported goods. 90 While support measures falling
within the definition of prohibited subsidies are illegal regardless
of their effects, the illegality of actionable subsidies rests upon an
effects-based analysis, providing that subsidies shall be deemed
illegal if they cause “adverse effects” to the interests of other
member-states, including injury to domestic producers, 91
nullification or impairment of direct or indirect benefits conferred
upon a member by virtue of the GATT, 92 or cause serious
prejudice to another member’s interests. 93 The circumstances in
which it is to be considered that serious prejudice occurred are
listed in Article 6 of the SCM Agreement, and include the scenario
in which “the effect of the subsidy is to displace or impede the
imports of a like product of another Member into the market of the
subsidizing Member.” 94
It is worth noting that all renewable energy subsidies that have
been subject to consultations, or subject to requests to convene
dispute settlement panels, within the WTO have had a purportedly
explicit discriminatory or protectionist character, hence falling
within the definition of a prohibited subsidy. For example, the
Ontarian FIT described above made eligibility for participation in
the FIT and microFIT schemes contingent on a domestic content
requirement, stating that a minimum amount of 50% of goods and
services for wind projects, and 60% for solar projects, shall come

88. SCM Agreement, supra note 61, at art. 8.2. Protected subsidies included
subsidies for research activities, subsidies to support disadvantaged regions, and
subsidies to help adaption to new environmental regulation.
89. Id. at art. 3.1(a) n. 4.
90. Id. at art. 3.1(b).
91. Id. at art. 5(a).
92. Id. at art. 5(b).
93. Id. at art. 5(c).
94. SCM Agreement, supra note 61, at art. 6.3(a).
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from Ontario. 95 Similarly, Chinese subsidies for wind power
equipment that were subject to a complaint by the US in 2010 were
purportedly contingent upon export performance and domestic
content requirements. 96
The second lesson is pertinent to government support measures
that fall within the definition of a subsidy, as understood by the
SCM Agreement. Non-discrimination is a key concept in WTO
law, and the provisions under which discriminatory subsidies may
be challenged are numerous. First, as noted above, Articles 3 and 5
of the SCM Agreement respectively provide that subsidies cannot
de jure 97 or de facto 98 discriminate between domestic and foreign
goods. Discriminatory subsidies may also be challenged under
Article III: 4 of the GATT and Article 2 of the TRIMs Agreement,
which prohibit measures that afford imported goods less favorable
regulatory treatment than that enjoyed by domestic goods. Finally,
in order for the subsidy to avail itself of the exception under
Article XX of the GATT, examined below, the chapeau requires
that a measure cannot be arbitrarily or unjustifiably
discriminatory. 99 The second lesson is simple and absolute: a
renewable energy subsidy that is discriminatory, in law or fact, will
not withstand a test of legality under the laws of the WTO.
VI. LESSONS THREE AND FOUR—LINKS TO INTERNATIONAL
AGREEMENTS AND OPEN AND TRANSPARENT PROCESSES
While the “safe-haven” category of non-actionable subsidies
has expired, commentators have argued that exceptions to the rules
of the GATT, available under Article XX, are equally applicable to
the provisions of the SCM Agreement. Article XX provides
exemptions for certain sensitive or virtuous policies, including
those that aim to protect animal, human, and plant life or health,100
public morals, 101 condemn prison labor, 102 and—most pertinently
95. OPA FIT Program Overview, supra note 12, at 6. For the microFIT
program, domestic content requirements are limited to projects using solar
photovoltaic cells, which must be composed of 60% domestic content. OPA
microFIT Program Overview, supra note 11, at 12.
96. See United Steelworkers, United Steelworkers' Section 301 Petition
Demonstrates China's Green Technology Practices Violate WTO Rules,
http://assets.usw.org/releases/misc/section-301.pdf (last visited Sept. 12, 2012).
97. By contingency upon export performance of the product or upon the use
of domestic products in the production of the good.
98. For example, subsidies cannot cause “adverse effects” on another
members market.
99. GATT, supra note 49, at art. XX.
100. Id. at art. XX(b).
101. Id. at art. XX(a).
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for our purposes—are aimed at the conservation of natural
resources. 103 Leaving open the question of the applicability of
Article XX exceptions to agreements outside the GATT, it is
nevertheless important to consider what steps a member should
take if they wish to avail themselves of the exceptions. 104
In order to assess if a provision may fall within an Article XX
exception, it is necessary to carry out a two-step analysis. First, the
provision must fall within the definition of one of the exempt
categories, of which we will take subsection (g) as an example, it
being the most readily applicable to renewable energy promotion
policies. 105 Second, the policy must pass the test under the
“chapeau” of Article XX, which outlaws measures that are
arbitrarily or unjustifiably discriminative, or those that are
disguised restrictions on international trade.
Article XX(g) provides an exception for measures “relating to
the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such measures
are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic
production or consumption.” This can be divided into two distinct
requirements. First, the measure must be related to the
conservation of exhaustible resources. In United States—Import
Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products (“US—
Shrimp”), the Appellate Body confirmed that Article XX(g) was
understood to cover the conservation of inanimate resources, such
as fossil fuels, as well as measures designed to conserve
exhaustible natural living resources, hence comprising renewable

102. Id. at art. XX(e).
103. Id. at art. XX(g).
104. On the applicability of Article XX to the SCM Agreement, see Brief of
Amicus Curiae Submission by International Institute on Sustainable
Development, Canadian Environmental Law Association & Ecojustice Canada,
Canada—Certain Measures Affecting the Renewable Energy Generation Sector
(DS412) (May 10, 2012), available at, http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2012/ecojustice
_amicus_curiae_brief.pdf; Daniel Peat, The Wrong Rules for the Right Energy:
the WTO SCM Agreement and Subsidies for Renewable Energy, 24 ENVTL. L. &
MGMT. 7 (2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=1998240; Wilke, supra note 9, at 8–12; Robert Howse, United
Nations Conference on Trade and Development, World Trade Law and
Renewable Energy: The Case of Non-Tariff Barriers, UN Doc. UNCTAD/
DITC/TED/2008/5 11–14 (2009), available at http://archive.unctad.org/trade_
env/test1/publications/UNCTAD_DITC_TED_2008_5.pdf.
105. Also, it should be noted that the requirements to invoke art. XX(b) are
more difficult to fulfill than those under art. XX(g), particularly because it must
be shown that the measure is necessary for the protection of human, animal or
plant life or health. Michael Hertel, Climate-Change-Related Trade Measures
and Article XX: Defining Discrimination in Light of the Principle of Common
but Differentiated Responsibilities, 45 J. WORLD TRADE 653, 669 (2011).
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energy promotion measures. 106 In light of the depletion of the
world’s fossil fuel resources, as well as the damage that climate
change causes to the world’s ecosystems more generally, measures
promoting renewable energy are manifestly related to this
objective. Second, the measure must be integrated with measures
restricting domestic consumption and production. The
compatibility of renewable energy policies with this criterion will
therefore depend on the structure of each specific policy or
measure, but should be met if the implementing government has a
general climate change mitigation policy in place.
The second step that must be passed is that of the chapeau of
Article XX, which was also dealt with comprehensively in USShrimp. In that case, the measures at issue were United States
regulatory requirements that imported shrimp must be caught using
harvesting methods that did not adversely affect sea turtles.
Specifically, in order for shrimp to be exported to the US, states
must have their regulatory framework certified to the effect that all
shrimp trawlers used “turtle excluding devices,” which prevent sea
turtles from being caught in the trawler’s net when shrimp
fishing. 107 India, Malaysia, Pakistan and Thailand brought a case to
the WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism alleging that the US
requirements breached certain provisions of the GATT. At the
panel stage of proceedings, the US conceded that the measures in
place constituted an illegal quantitative restriction under the
meaning of Article XI GATT, but argued that the requirements
under the Act were justified by Article XX(g). The Appellate Body
recognized that the US regulations prima facie fit the requirements
of subsection (g), and continued to analyze them in light of the
chapeau of Article XX. The Chapeau states that:
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not
applied in a manner which would constitute a means of
arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries
where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised
restriction on international trade, nothing in this
Agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption or
enforcement by any contracting party of measure . . . . 108

106. See Appellate Body Report, United States—Import Prohibition of
Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/AB/R ¶¶128–131 (Oct. 12,
1998), available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/58abr.pdf
[hereinafter “US-Shrimp”].
107. See Sea Turtle Conservation; Shrimp Trawling Requirements, 52 FR
24244, Pub. L. No. 101–62, 103 Stat. 988, § 609(b)(2) (1987).
108. GATT, supra note 49, at art. XX (emphasis added).
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In deeming that the US regulations constituted an unjustifiable
and arbitrary discrimination between countries, the Appellate Body
relied predominantly on four characteristics of the implementation
of the US rules. First, the Appellate Body noted that the US rules
obliged states wanting to export to the US to adopt effectively the
same regulatory standards as the US in order to be able to exercise
their rights to trade under the GATT, 109 even if different conditions
prevailed in those states. 110 Further, even states using identical
methods as those required by the US law were excluded from
exporting to the US simply because the state in question had not
been certified as meeting US standards. This prompted the
Appellate Body to state:
[W]e believe that discrimination results not only when
countries in which the same conditions prevail are
differently treated, but also when the application of the
measure at issue does not allow for any enquiry [sic] into
the appropriateness of the regulatory program for the
conditions prevailing in those exporting countries. 111
Aside from the adoption of this “single, rigid and
unbending” 112 regime that did not account for circumstantial
differences, the Appellate Body identified a second discriminatory
characteristic of the US policy. They found the asymmetry of
treatment afforded to exporting states by the US administration to
be discriminatory, with those in the wider Caribbean/western
Atlantic region given a period three times longer in which to adapt
their regulatory systems than other exporting states. 113 Third, the
Appellate Body gave weight to the failure of the US:
[T]o engage the appellees, as well as other Members
exporting shrimp to the United States, in serious, acrossthe-board negotiations with objective of concluding
bilateral or multilateral agreements for the protection and
conservation of sea turtles, before enforcing the import
prohibition against the shrimp exports of those other
members. 114

109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

US-Shrimp, supra note 106, at ¶¶ 161–62.
Id. at ¶ 164.
Id. at ¶ 165.
Id. at ¶ 177.
Id. at ¶ 173.
Id. at ¶ 166.
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The US did, however, engage in dialogue with some other WTO
members towards finding mutually acceptable solutions. 115 This
approach to negotiations was, in the view of the Appellate Body,
“plainly discriminatory and, in our view, unjustifiable.” 116 Finally,
the Appellate Body emphasized the “non-transparent and ex parte
nature of the internal government procedures . . . throughout the
certification processes . . .” 117 particularly the lack of formal denial
of certification for some states, and the lack of reasons given for
denial. This consolidated the conclusion that the US regulations
constituted both unjustifiable and arbitrary discrimination. 118
While the Appellate Body in US-Shrimp did not find it
necessary to examine if the US measures constituted a “disguised
restriction on international trade” under the chapeau of Article XX,
GATT panels in the United States—Prohibition of Imports of Tuna
and Tuna Products from Canada 119 and United States—Imports of
Certain Automotive Spring Assemblies 120 cases examined this
issue, coming to differing opinions on whether publicity of a
measure by a public authority automatically ruled out its
qualification as a “disguised restriction.” This division was settled
by the Appellate Body in another case, United States—Standards
for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, 121 in which the
Appellate Body held that a “concealed or unannounced restriction
or discrimination in international trade does not exhaust the
meaning of ‘disguised restriction.’” 122 This interpretation was
followed by the panel in European Communities—Measures
Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products, 123 which
continued to determine that the intent of a measure should be based
on an analysis of its “design, architecture and revealing
115. US-Shrimp, supra note 106, at ¶ 169. Specifically with Brazil, Costa
Rica, Nicaragua and Peru in the framework of the Inter-American Sea Turtle
Convention. See Inter-American Convention for the Protection and
Conservation of Sea Turtles art. XV, Dec. 1, 1996, 2164 U.N.T.S. 29, 31.
116. US-Shrimp, supra note 104, at ¶ 172.
117. Id. at ¶ 183.
118. Id. at ¶ 184.
119. Report of the Panel, United States—Prohibition of Imports of Tuna and
Tuna Products from Canada, GATT B.I.S.D. (29th Supp.) at 91 (1982).
120. Report of the Panel, United States—Imports of Certain Automotive
Spring Assemblies, GATT B.I.S.D. (30th Supp.) at 108 (1983).
121. Appellate Body Report, United States—Standards for Reformulated and
Conventional Gasoline, WT/DS2/AB/R (Apr. 29, 1996), available at http://
www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/2-9.pdf.
122. Id. at 24–25.
123. Panel Report, European Communities—Measures Affecting Asbestos
and Asbestos-Containing Products, WT/DS135/R ¶ 8.232 (Sep. 18, 2000),
available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/135r_c_e.pdf.
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structure.” 124 An effective subsidy for renewable energy must,
therefore, not manifest any characteristics of a restriction on trade,
which is to be considered in conjunction with the nondiscrimination mandated under the first part of the chapeau of
Article XX.
The third and fourth lessons, taken together, are aimed at
ensuring that a subsidy, even if deemed illegal, may avail itself of
the potential exception available under Article XX of the GATT.
While necessary, but not singularly sufficient, to come within the
remit of an exception, the lessons present the most important steps
in fulfilling the cumulative criteria identified in the preceding
analysis. The third lesson suggests that subsidies should have a
clear and explicit link to goals or targets established by
international agreements, such as those set by Annex B countries
within the framework of the Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change. 125 Explicit reference
to international targets serves two purposes in relation to Article
XX. First and most importantly, it augments the “relatedness” of
the subsidy to the goal of the conservation of natural resources,
required by the wording of Article XX(g). Second, an explicit link
demonstrates to a WTO panel that the policy does not constitute a
“disguised restriction on trade,” as prohibited under the chapeau of
Article XX. In addition, reference to international GHG-reduction
targets could usefully serve as the basis for objective criteria
governing the eligibility for subsidies, as examined in the first
lesson. An explicit link could be included within, for example,
implementing legislation providing that energy efficiency devices
that contributed by a certain percentage towards the attainment of
the WTO member’s internationally agreed GHG reduction target
were to be recipients of government support.
The fourth lesson takes inspiration from the US-Shrimp case to
suggest that WTO member-state governments should engage other
members in dialogue regarding, and allow them to comment upon,
climate change mitigation subsidies when they are in their
formative stages. By doing this, the implementing state is
following the optimal method for ensuring that their support
policies are not challenged in the WTO Dispute Settlement
Mechanism—they address the concerns of other members and open
channels of dialogue that may alter the design of the policy to a
mutually-acceptable solution before a trade dispute arises. This
124. Id. at ¶ 8.236.
125. Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change, Dec. 10, 1997, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/1997/7/Add.1, 37 I.L.M.
22 (1998).
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transparency should continue into the implementation phase of the
policy, enabling the implementing state to make manifest to other
WTO members that no “arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination”
within the meaning of the chapeau of Article XX is taking place.
Both the third and fourth lessons are cost-effective and feasible
methods of ensuring that a renewable energy subsidy meets the
requisites of Article XX. What remains to be seen, however, is the
willingness of WTO panels, or the Appellate Body, to explicitly
recognize the applicability of Article XX to provisions contained
within agreements outside the GATT. 126
VII. CONCLUSION
The international trade regime is at a critical juncture in its
history. With the conclusion or modification of multilateral trade
agreements in the near future rendered impossible by the impasse
in the Doha Round negotiations, WTO members should account
for the rigors of the current WTO disciplines in the formative
stages of their policy design to avoid the undesirable result of a
determination of illegality. After comprehensively reviewing the
WTO legal texts and Dispute Settlement Mechanism
jurisprudence, this Comment suggested four lessons that should be
followed by member-states wishing to implement subsidies for
renewable energy. First, it suggested that financial support from
renewable energy production or equipment could avoid
“specificity” under the meaning of Article 2 of the SCM
Agreement—and hence avoid falling under the rules for subsidies
in the WTO—by effective integration into an objective, neutral and
horizontal comprehensive climate change mitigation policy.
Second, it noted that the principle of non-discrimination should be
strictly adhered to in the context of renewable energy subsidies in
the international trade regime. Third, it argued that linking these
comprehensive climate change policies to international agreements
and commitments could assist in helping the policy either avoid
specificity or, failing that, to fall within the exception covered
under Article XX(g). Finally, this Comment pointed out the
importance of transparency and inclusiveness throughout the
design and implementation stages of the policy process, and
highlighted the desirability of mutually acceptable solutions as
opposed to judicially settled disputes.
The WTO presents an opportunity for the world to increase
members’ long-run wealth, yet this cannot be allowed to impact
126. This may be clarified by the panel in the forthcoming Canada—
Renewables (DS412) case.
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the obligation that the global community has to mitigate
anthropogenic climate change. Subsidies for renewable energy are
vulnerable to legal challenge within the WTO, whether such a
challenge is motivated by political, economic or legal reasons,
placing the burden on implementing states to ensure legality under
the existing international trade rules. In the short-run, appropriate
policy design based upon a thorough analysis of the obligations
binding WTO members is the most effective method of ensuring
the legality of subsidies for renewable energy.

